Russia’s attack on Ukraine and Moscow’s blatant threats to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine’s supporters have confronted Western public opinion with the danger of nuclear escalation for the first time since the end of the Cold War. This means that the concept of nuclear deterrence, with all its advantages, dangers and dilemmas, is once again a core element of transatlantic security policy. At the 75th anniversary Summit in Washington, NATO leaders, for the first time in decades, even spoke about modernizing the alliance’s nuclear capabilities.
Exactly how this modernization should take place will be the subject of future discussions. But one thing is already clear: Such politico-military debates require above all subject-matter expertise – or, as it is known in NATO, a sufficient nuclear IQ. This applies not only to political decision makers but also to the need of creating an informed public.
Germany’s nuclear IQ is currently in a poor state. The brief public debate in early 2024 on how to respond to Donald Trump’s announcements that, as U.S. president, he would question the American promise to protect its allies, revealed a profound lack of knowledge in large parts of politics, in the press and even among supposed experts. Statements by members of parliament revealed considerable gaps in knowledge, and a well-known German historian seriously suggested in a press interview that the European Union should procure its own nuclear weapons and — in the absence of EU statehood – rotate the “red button” between the European capitals.
So much ignorance is frightening, but it can be found in many non-nuclear NATO states. The widespread narrative since the 1990s, particularly in Western Europe, of being “surrounded by friends” has caused general interest in security and defence policy to wane. Nuclear issues were frowned upon and were only discussed, if at all, in small circles of experts. “Peace research” was often misunderstood as a substitute for strategic thinking and nuclear weapons were seen almost exclusively as objects of nuclear disarmament.
To reverse this trend and to provide Germany with the nuclear expertise necessary to pursue its interests in a new security environment, a nuclear “Zeitenwende” will be necessary. This will require adaptations in universities, in the armed forces, in think tanks and in the wide field of civil education.
Generating security policy expertise for politics, journalism or the public begins at universities. Currently, the number of professors who offer seminars on deterrence or nuclear issues in their political seminars in Germany is almost negligible. Changing this will not only require government funding for security policy and strategy professorships. It would also necessitate efforts to counter the stigmatisation of security policy within the German educational system, where the few professors who deal with nuclear strategy issues still face rejection and protest both within and outside their institutions.
Also, the German armed forces and the Ministry of Defence have long ignored the relevance of nuclear deterrence. In last two decades, the General Staff College of the Bundeswehr taught nuclear deterrence only as a side issue and in the German MoD only two (!) of the approximately 2,500 employees deal explicitly with nuclear issues. It is obvious that with these limited capacities, it is difficult to meet NATO’s requirements for independent nuclear positions, particularly as Germany is a country where American nuclear weapons are stationed.
The same holds true for the German think tank landscape. Of the roughly 30 foreign and security policy think tanks, only one or two deal with nuclear issues on a permanent and structured basis. Changing this overnight is difficult, as the number of academic experts in the field is still scarce. Moreover, since – unlike in the United States – there is little exchange of personnel between ministries and foreign and security policy research institutes, the relationship between the two worlds is not always free of tension. Ministries often complain that the think tanks do not provide the analyses required for day-to-day work, while think tank representatives often complain that political decision makers are resistant to advice. This could be remedied by offering more think tankers to spend a few months in a ministry to learn what form of policy advice is required in ministerial bureaucracies.
Finally, Germany has a vast number of political education institutions – often state-funded – that address both political decision makers and the public. Those which focus on security policy should be requested to include questions on nuclear deterrence more strongly in their educational programs.
However, when addressing nuclear strategy issues in politics and society, it is important that knowledge transfer is not misunderstood as nuclear indoctrination, but that the strengths and weaknesses of a security policy based on deterrence are openly identified. Nuclear deterrence is a partly contradictory concept that raises painful political or ethical questions. Addressing these openly and self-critically, even when conclusive and universally satisfactory answers cannot be found, is also part of the nuclear IQ.
Karl-Heinz Kamp was a Special Advisor in the German Ministry of Defence and is an Associate Fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations
